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Key messages
1 In the early contracting phase (2004 – 2005), the Ministry of Public Health in Afghanistan successfully 
managed contracts in a post-conflict context. Contracting-out was associated not only with an overall 
increase in curative care use but also with an increase in use by the poor and female patients. Whether or 
not contracts had performance bonuses resulted in minor differences. 
2 A comparison study (2005–2008) on the pro-poor effect of different contracting schemes revealed that 
contracting-out with non-negotiable deliverables, but some flexibility in the arrangement, and performance 
bonuses linked to equity goals, can be effective for 
reducing the inequity of facility-based health services. 
Community Health Workers should also be included in 
performance-based financing arrangements. 
3 The 2010–2012 pay-for-performance (P4P) intervention 
to improve maternal child health services did not 
produce the intended results. The impact evaluation of 
this intervention highlighted the need for more attention 
to demand-side factors, a better understanding not 
only of the relationship between P4P and health worker 
motivation and behaviour, but also of the bottlenecks to 
service use in order for these to be addressed holistically.
4 System dynamics modelling was used to explore 
implementation pathways for improving health 
systems performance through P4P schemes. 
Specific implementation strategies, such as prompt 
disbursement of adequate levels of performance bonus 
distributed per health workers' contribution to service, 
increase the likelihood of P4P success. Poorly designed 
P4P schemes can have a negative overall impact on 
health service delivery systems.
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The Afghanistan experience of nearly 15 years of contracting for health services has demonstrated 
both how results-based financing (RBF) can serve to increase utilisation of health services and the 
equity in use, as well as the limitations and failings of RBF approaches to work consistently.  
Future Health Systems (FHS) findings, generated through robust experimental and quasi-experimental 
studies in a rapidly changing context, suggests that attention to scheme design (especially to 
address demand side concerns, supply side capabilities, and the size and mechanisms of payments) 
and implementation (timeliness and communication about payments) are critical.
Introduction
The Afghanistan Government, with the 
support of the World Bank, USAID, and the 
European Union, has experimented with 
several models of RBF schemes since 2004. 
These include contracting models involving 
performance bonuses; three other contracting-
out and contracting-in models with local and 
international NGOs, which were tested from 
2004 to 2008, renewed in 2009/2010 and are 
still ongoing; and a large-scale P4P contracting 
scheme supported through World Bank funding 
that started in 2010 and continues as one of the 
contracting models. 
Future Health Systems partner, Johns Hopkins 
Bloomberg School of Public Health had a field 
office in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2013, 
working with the Ministry of Public Health 
(MoPH) to develop a national Balanced 
Scorecard (BSC) for health services. This BSC 
was intended to help the MoPH operationalise 
its national health policies and assess its 
health system performance, the first of its 
kind anywhere in the world. The initial BSC 
covered the assessment of a basic package of 
primary care services, with a subsequent BSC 
created for the assessment of essential hospital 
services. Community level scorecards were later 
piloted as a planning and social accountability 
intervention with DFID support. The BSCs – 
which collected data nationally from health 
facilities, patients and health providers, and 
from household surveys – provided a platform 
to improve performance and test a number of 
policy experiments, including assessments of the 
initial contracting schemes and the subsequent 
P4P scheme. 
Evidence
Early contracting experience (2004–2005)
In the early contracting phase, which included 
contracting models involving performance 
bonuses, the MoPH, which was inexperienced 
at the time, was able to successfully manage 
contracts in the context of restoring health 
services and rebuilding institutional capacity after 
long-standing civil conflict. Evidence suggests 
that large-scale contracting for health services 
in Afghanistan can result in substantial increases 
in curative care use. Not only is contracting-out 
associated with an overall increase in service 
use, but also with an increase in use by the poor 
and female patients, thus making it an effective 
approach to achieving the MoPH’s public 
health policy goals for service utilisation. There 
were only minor differences between providers 
with contracts that had performance bonuses 
and those that did not. Having performance 
benchmarks, disclosing results, and linking 
performance to the continuation of a contract 
seem important to the success of each form of 
the contracting. 
Reaching the poor (2005–2008)
A comparison of four contracting models and 
a non-contracting model from 2005 to 2008 
shows that how contracts are designed matter 
significantly, in how health services can reach 
the poor. Contracting out health services 
provision to non-state providers 
and allowing contractors to 
allocate funds within a fixed 
budget sum with non-negotiable 
deliverables is effective for 
reducing the inequity of facility-
based health services. Flexibility 
in the contracting arrangement 
provides the opportunity for 
contractors to seek innovative 
pathways that may not be perceptible to the 
contractee in meeting the contract deliverables.
Linking equity goals to a performance bonus for 
service providers may be an effective strategy for 
reducing the inequity of facility-based services 
utilisation between the poor and non-poor. 
Community Health Workers are critical for 
increasing demands for health facility-based 
services among the poor and should be included 
in performance-based financing arrangements 
for achieving health equity. 
The 2010–2012 pay-for-performance 
intervention 
From 2010 to 2012 a P4P programme in 
Afghanistan provided quarterly bonus payments 
to health-care providers for increases in the use 
of maternal and child health (MCH) services, 
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 Evidence suggests 
that large-scale 
contracting for health 
services in Afghanistan 
can result in substantial 
increases in curative 
care use. 
adjusted by a quality of care score. A large-
scale cluster randomised trial of this P4P 
scheme revealed that despite high expectations, 
P4P incentives to improve maternal child health 
services do not always work as intended at the 
population level. P4P is intended to improve 
health worker motivation and satisfaction, but 
this did not occur in the Afghanistan study. The 
insufficient focus on demand-side factors and 
difficulty in communicating to health workers 
about the intervention may have undermined 
the potential effects of the P4P intervention. 
Therefore, more attention needs to be given 
to these factors in the design, management 
and implementation of P4P programmes. 
Further research into the relationship between 
P4P incentives and their effects on health 
worker motivation and behaviour, as well 
as on organisational culture, leadership, 
management and psychology, would help 
address important bottlenecks to service use in 
the intervention design. 
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How to improve health systems performance 
through pay-for-performance schemes
System dynamics modelling was used to explore 
implementation pathways for improving health 
systems performance through P4P schemes, based 
on the Afghanistan data. Theories of change are 
critical to understanding how P4P interventions 
can work: Modelling provides quantitative results 
to inform the theory of change of supply-side 
P4P intervention and show the impact of various 
implementation scenarios and design choices 
on P4P effectiveness. The optimal P4P design 
and implementation features for improving 
performance of health systems in low-and-middle 
income countries include prompt disbursement of 
adequate levels of performance bonus distributed 
per health workers’ contribution to service. Other 
ways of paying providers (such as equal allocation 
or allocations proportionate to salaries) and failure 
to mitigate gaming can result in health services 
quality and volume levels that are substantially 
lower, sometimes even below baseline levels.
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Afghanistan’s use of RBF to increase access and equity in health services utilisation provides useful 
learnings for other countries exploring options for contracting providers, as well as those reflecting 
on their own experiences. Future Health Systems partners’ collaboration with the Afghanistan 
Government helped to facilitate embedded research and evaluation to test and guide the 
implementation of a number of policy initiatives, generating important knowledge to strengthen 
and adapt strategies.
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